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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 08/07/2011

Accident number: 723

Accident time: 11:07

Accident Date: 21/07/2007

Where it occurred: Task:
AF/1208/12494/MF000
9, Datshte Chinar
Village, Rostaq
District, Takhir
Province
Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Country: Afghanistan

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 08/08/2007

ID original source: OPS/ 03/ 01 - 45

Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PMN-2 AP blast

Ground condition: rocks/stones
Date last modified: 08/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
use of pick (?)
use of shovel (?)
inadequate training (?)
inadequate equipment (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)
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Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date was in a UNMACCA
“Lessons Learned” document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original
formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more
information becomes available.
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

File: OPS/ 03/ 01 - 45
To: See distribution list below [List removed]
From: [Name removed]
Date: 8 August 2007
Subject: Investigation Report and Lessons Learned – [Demining group] Demining
Accident
Reference:
Please find attached the Investigation Report and Lessons Learned from the demining
accident involving [Demining group] Demining Team 01 that occurred at Datshte Chinar
Village, Takhir Province on 21 July 2007.
Regards, [Name removed, Chief of Operations
United Nations Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan, Kabul, AFGHANISTAN

Lessons learned from [Demining group] demining accident on 21 July 2007
INTRODUCTION
An internal investigation team was convened by the Area Manager of AMAC North East
(Kunduz) into the demining accident involving [the Victim] a deminer from [Demining group]
Demining Team 01. The accident occurred at 11.07 hours on 21 July 2007 at Task:
AF/1208/12494/MF0009 located near to Dashti Chinar Village, in Rostaq District of Takhar
Province. The accident resulted in face, eye, hand and chest injuries to the deminer and
destroyed his helmet and PPE.

SUMMARY OF EVENTS
The demining task site was located on a hillside in rocky terrain that was heavily
contaminated by Anti-Personnel mines (AP mines). Over the period of the clearance
operation Demining Teams had located and destroyed 59 x PMN-2 Russian AP mines and 2
x UXO. Just prior to the accident the deminer was performing excavation drills using a folding
shovel and pick and requested to take a break as he was bored, which was granted.
Demining team management claim the deminer was injured when he laid his helmet and PPE
down onto a mine, which was in an un-cleared area, as he was moving back to take a break
from his work. The Section Leader who had previously been observing him work was moving
to observe another party when the accident occurred.
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The casualty was first evacuated to Rustaq Hospital, Kunduz and then moved to the German
PRT Hospital in Kunduz for further treatment.

CONCLUSIONS
The investigation team made the following conclusions regarding the accident;
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

The accident site had not been preserved intact as is required in AMAS.
The injuries received by the deminer were not conducive to him wearing his helmet
and PPE at the time of the accident as is required when ever inside a hazard area.
There was no evidence of the helmet and PPE having been destroyed at the scene of
the deminers work place. There was however evidence that indicated the helmet and
PPE may have been destroyed approximately 7 metres away from the scene of the
accident in a previously cleared area.
There was a 250 gram discrepancy in the total usage of explosive recorded in the
teams Explosive Records and physically in the explosive store.
There was a 50 km discrepancy between the team’s vehicle odometer and its log
book.
Local villagers confirmed some demining team members returned to the clearance
site after normal working hours.
The Team and Section Leader display very poor management, supervision and
command and control of the work performed by its team.

RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations shall occur;
•

•
•
•

•

All IPs are to be reminded of their responsibility to take immediate photographs of a
demining incident sites, and then preserve the site intact until it is inspected and
released by the investigation team. This means nothing should be tampered with or
removed!
All staff are to be reminded that PPE shall be worn at ALL times once moving into the
hazard area after leaving the administration area.
The Team and Section Leader of [Demining group] DT 01 shall be demoted
immediately to Section Leader and Deminer respectively and re-employed into other
teams.
Accreditation for [Demining group] DT 01 is to remain suspended until such time as a
new Team and Section Leader has been found and the new team has undergone
refresher training to be observed by QA Staff from AMAC North East and new
accreditation is issued.
The Area Manager of AMAC North East shall provide a detailed program of revision
subjects for the [Demining group] DT 01 to achieve prior to it undertaking
accreditation. This program is to include specific benchmarks and timelines so as not
to delay the team’s return to work when all standards have been met.

Victim Report
Victim number: 914

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: None
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Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: severe Chest; severe Eye; severe Face; severe Hand
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available.

Analysis
The activity at the time of the accident is inferred from the injury range and the attempt by the
field managers to conceal the truth about the activity at the time of the accident.
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the
investigators found that the Victim was not wearing his visor at the time. Chest injuries also
imply that he was not wearing his body protection. The secondary cause is listed as a
Management Control Inadequacy because the investigators found that the group’s managers
had sought to conceal the real circumstances of the accident after the event. The suspension
of the group’s accreditation implies that this was not in any doubt.
Inadequate training is listed under Notes because the investigators determined that retraining
was necessary – it is notable that this was also necessary for the supervisors.
The use of a pick-axe and shovel to excavate are the Inadequate equipment listed under
Notes.
The Inadequate investigation listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident report.
The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years in
contravention of the requirements of the IMAS. That said, the Lessons Learned summary
implies that a comprehensive and objective investigation was conducted, for which those
responsible should be applauded.
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